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Introduction 
This study is a sequel to the 2012 Sheng and Singh article that identified and explained 
the significance of the two central tenets of Islamic finance: namely, its underpinning by a strong 
ethical system, and the absolute prohibition of the use of interest rates.  That study also argued 
that the cooperation between the conventional Western system and the Islamic system is 
eminently sensible and will lead to a Pareto optimal increase in world welfare.
1
  
Our earlier study noted that Islamic finance has been growing at a fast rate over the last 
two decades, and concluded that it is a complete system that has the potential to satisfy the 
financing and banking needs not only of Muslims worldwide but also of non-Muslims in various 
countries.  It offers the world an additional financial system favoring profits derived from capital 
and labor working together, rather than interest, and with a rather different ethical basis than that 
of current Western capitalism.
2
 
 This study looks at a much narrower but current issue of establishing and operating 
Islamic stock markets within a global context.  Islamic stock markets would compete against 
non-Islamic markets.  If Islamic stock markets were successful, they would strengthen and 
enhance the international appeal and practice of Islamic finance.   Leading Islamic scholars have 
long argued in favor of Islamic stock markets, even though they recognize that many practices in 
conventional stock markets may be incompatible with Islamic teaching.  In 1984, Professor 
Mukhtar Metwally observed:  
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 Pareto optimal refers to the state of the world in which while no person’s welfare decreases, everyone else’s 
welfare remains the same or increases. Alternatively, no one can be made better off without making at least one 
individual worse off. 
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 For a full discussion of the issues, see Sheng and Singh (2012).  
In an Islamic economy where interest-bearing loans are prohibited and where direct participation 
in business enterprise, with its attendant risks and profit sharing, is encouraged, the existence of a 
well-functioning Stock Exchange is very important.  It would allow for the mobilization of 
savings for investment and provide means for liquidity to individual shareholders.  However, 
existing Stock Exchanges in non-Islamic economies have many drawbacks.  They generate 
practices such as speculation and fluctuations in share prices which are not related to the 
economic performance of enterprises.  These practices are inconsistent with the teachings of 
Islam. (Metwally 1984, 19) 
In 2011, one of the foremost scholars of Islamic economics and finance, Professor Abbas 
Mirakhor, argued in the Islamic Finance Forum for government intervention to develop truly 
vibrant and active Islamic stock markets.  He noted that risk sharing is central to Islamic finance 
and observed that “arguably, the stock market is the first-best instrument of risk-sharing.  
Developing an active and efficient stock market can promote international as well as domestic 
risk sharing which render the economy and its financial system resilient to shocks.”  (Mirakhor 
2011, 23) 
Coincidentally, Islamic scholars’ positive interest in Islamic stock markets arose at the 
same time as a vigorous debate in economics on the non-Islamic stock market’s negative 
consequences.  The role of the stock market in propagating if not generating important 
dimensions of the current international financial crisis, has been a subject of many serious 
commentaries.  As this study intends to draw suggestions for an Islamic stock market from the 
experience and analysis of the stock market in non-Islamic countries, we intend to explore what 
are the weaknesses of the current stock market model.   
Most analysts agree that one of the significant causes of the 2007–09 3Great Recession 
was the U.S. housing bubble.  The ending of this bubble led to a fall in share prices not only in 
the United States but also around the world due to the close integration of world stock markets 
that had occurred in the previous two decades.  Oliver Blanchard (2009) estimates  bank losses 
due to the failure of the subprime mortgage market to be around $250 billion.  However, the 
consequent financial crisis led to “contagion” and a sharp fall in aggregate world stock market 
capitalization of the order of $26 trillion—nearly 100 times larger than the losses associated with 
subprime mortgages.  Similarly, Robert Solow (2009) notes that the combined result of the 
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 There is no consensus on the date of the beginning of the crisis. Many economists, however, 
suggest that the crisis began with the demise of the Lehmann Brothers in 2008. The World Bank 
however, regards 2007-09 as the crisis date. Other economists extend the crisis period to include 
2011-2012 as well.  
housing and stock market shocks was a decline in U.S. household wealth from $64.4 trillion in 
mid-2007 (before the crisis) to $51.5 trillion at the end of 2008.  Thus $13 trillion of household 
wealth disappeared in the space of about one year.  Solow (2009) notes: “Nothing concrete had 
changed.  Buildings still stood, factories were still capable of functioning; people had not lost 
their ability to work or their skills or their technology.  But a population that thought in 2007 that 
they had 64.4 trillion dollars with which to plan their lives discovered in 2008 that they have lost 
20 percent of that.” 
Thus one important aspect of a stock market regime is that globalization may make an 
economy unstable through contagion, even though there is no intrinsic reason for the country to 
be subject to fluctuations.  Such external shocks often end up with a procyclical feedback loop 
between two volatile financial markets: namely, the stock market and the market for foreign 
exchange.  These macroeconomic effects of the stock market are usually neglected in the 
economic literature and policy analysis.  This is mainly because the corporate finance economists 
who specialize in this area tend to work with microeconomic models.  This study attempts to 
address this lacunae.  
In 2011, the British government invited a committee under London School of Economics 
professor John Kay to review the UK equity market and its impact on long-term decision making 
(Kay 2012).  Its report,  published in July 2012, identified two important principles that turn out 
to be relevant to the establishment of stock markets in Islamic countries:    
1. All participants in the equity investment chain should act according to the principles 
of stewardship, based on respect for those whose funds are invested or managed, 
and trust in those by whom the funds are invested or managed. 
2. Relationships based on trust and respect are everywhere more effective in 
promoting high performance of companies and securing good returns to savers 
taken as a whole than trading transactions between anonymous agents. 
These notions of stewardship, trust, and respect are clearly more closely aligned with the 
Islamic precepts and beliefs of the participants. There is a strong pressure  toward the promotion 
of these more ethical values in Islamic culture.   
The discussion that follows examines the problems of primary and secondary aspects of 
the non-Islamic stock markets and other critiques of corporate governance, and explores how 
Islamic stock markets should avoid these defects.  We do this because the stock market is not 
only an important symbol of capitalism, but also has a wider role in the economy to promote 
investment and create employment.  The case for and against the stock market inevitably 
involves a discussion of important related subjects of corporate finance, corporate governance, 
and corporate law.  The relationship between the legal system and the stock market, and  the 
relationship between corporate finance and the stock market, are salient to any assessment of the 
role of the stock market in economic development.  This study presents a nuanced and balanced 
view of the feasibility and desirability of  Islamic stock markets.  It suggests that Islamic stock 
markets can compete effectively against non-Islamic stock markets by improving on corporate 
controls and serving the real sector by helping small and medium enterprises (SMEs) raise 
capital.  This requires the creation of a class of intermediaries that nurture the SMEs before they 
access capital markets.  
Specifically, this study reflects on the following questions: 
 Do stock market economies grow faster than economies where stock markets are 
relatively little used? 
 Stock markets have an ability to finance technological developments and 
therefore have an important role in principle in supporting new technology.  Are 
stock market economies more conducive to technical change and economic 
development than non-stock market economies? 
 To be compatible with Shari’ah law, an Islamic stock market will need to 
eliminate short-termism, speculation, and strategic pricing by stock market 
participants among other practices.  What kind of regulation, formal or informal, 
will be required to achieve this? 
 How well does the stock market perform its essential task of pooling  society’s 
savings dispersed among individual savers, to channel these savings selectively to 
companies with the best investment prospects?  
 How does the stock market ensure the efficient use of assets that embody past 
savings? 
 What are the implications of the stock market development for corporate 
governance?  
  What are the implications of the mode of financing of corporate growth for stock 
markets in emerging countries? 
 
The discussion will review the evidence on some of the more important above issues from the 
data on non-Islamic stock markets and examine the implications of this analysis for the potential 
development in Islamic stock markets. 
Do Stock Markets Help Economic 
Development? 
The mainstream free market ideology that permeated financial market theory and 
development economics thinking recommended almost without reservation the establishment of 
stock markets in emerging markets as positive factor for growth.  In the 1990s, the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) helped establish stock markets in many emerging markets and led the 
wave of portfolio investment in emerging stocks as an asset class. 
Their argument for stock markets is two-fold.  First, the World Bank concluded that the 
bank-dominated financial systems of developing countries in the 1980s were failing.  The debt-
based system, together with policy-based allocation of government funds, particularly to big 
domestic corporations to promote industrialization, was unsatisfactory because of excessive 
leverage, crony capitalism, and inefficient and inflationary finance. 
The second argument was what may be called natural progression.  The basic idea is that 
stock market development is a part of a natural progression of countries toward higher stages of 
development.  As countries become richer, they also expand and modernize their capital markets, 
with the stock markets as the foundation of deep derivative markets.  Stock market development 
became an emblem of economic development, just as airports were emblems in the 1960s. 
These views were supported by advanced market fund managers and some emerging 
market intellectuals.  The former wanted a wider range of assets to diversify their risks, with 
opportunities to improve their risk-return frontier.  The latter group argued that long-term capital 
for developing countries should come from the huge accumulated savings of Western investment 
institutions, such as pension funds and insurance companies.  This would reduce emerging 
market debt overhang.  Stock markets would also enable government assets to be privatized and 
foreign exchange to be obtained. Emerging market companies would be able to raise capital to 
expand overseas.   
The proponents of the conventional stock market model suggest that deep and liquid 
stock markets improve four key functions of capital markets: resource allocation, price 
discovery, risk management, and corporate governance.  Enhancing deep and liquid capital 
markets in emerging markets not only enable long-term direct and portfolio investments to be 
channeled from developed markets, but long-term capital to be raised, which in turn can  create 
jobs and growth.  Furthermore, price discovery is improved as stock markets “signal” the 
attractiveness of “undiscovered” emerging market firms. With the arrival of advanced market 
investors and intermediaries, risk management and corporate governance are improved.   
There is no question that primary and secondary stock markets enable emerging market 
entrepreneurs to raise capital and “double leverage” their assets, since they can not only raise 
capital in primary issues, but also use their (now) liquid holdings as collateral to raise more 
capital in the secondary market or through the banking system.   
While there has been substantial financial deepening in many emerging markets, the 
volatility of such markets, with booms and busts and sharp fluctuations in capital flows, has 
resulted in a more nuanced reexamination of the cost and benefits of stock markets for economic 
development.  The following sections examine these more systematically in order to see what 
lessons can be drawn for Islamic stock markets.   
First, the series of stock market debacles since the Asian financial crisis, tech stock 
bubble, the Gulf stock market crash, and the Great Recession all suggest that short-termism, 
excessive market volatility, lack of corporate control, social inequities, and weak risk 
management are endemic in the existing structure.   
Second, the case against speculative stock markets was powerfully argued in the depths 
of the Great Depression by John Maynard Keynes in his General Theory:  
Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprises.  But the position is 
serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation.  When the capital 
development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to 
be ill-done.  The measure of success attained by Wall Street, regarded as an institution of which 
social purpose is to direct new investment into the most profitable channels in terms of future 
yield, cannot be claimed as one of the outstanding triumphs of laissez-faire capitalism. (Keynes 
1936, 159)    
Third, these critiques of the stock market were given fresh impetus by a report of a Blue 
Ribbon Committee of 25 leading U.S. finance specialists established in the 1990s. The 
Committee was chaired by Harvard Professor Michael Porter,  and its purpose was to investigate 
to what extent the American financial system and the stock market in particular were responsible 
for the poor overall American economic performance, particularly during the period 1980–95, 
when the U.S. economy was stagnant; the trend rate of growth of U.S. productivity was virtually 
zero during this period.  The Committee concluded:  
The change in nature of competition and the increasing pressure of globalization make 
investment the most critical determinant of competitive advantage.  Yet the US system of 
allocating investment capital both within and across companies is failing.  This puts America at a 
serious disadvantage in global competition and ultimately threatens the long term growth of the 
US economy. (Porter 1992,  4)   
 
Fourth, the Kay Review (2012,  9) uncovered serious deficiencies in the current model: 
“Short-termism is a problem in the UK equity markets, and  [the] principal causes are the decline 
of trust and the misalignment of incentives throughout the equity investment chain.” Indeed, the 
Kay Review  found that UK companies have not been  investing as much as their foreign 
competitors and that smaller companies are finding difficulty in accessing capital.  Furthermore, 
successful companies are beginning to privatize themselves because of the regulatory burdens, 
while investors are complaining that the long-term returns on investing in listed companies have 
been disappointing. 
 
Lessons for Islamic Stock Markets 
Given these contrasting perspectives, what are the appropriate lessons to be drawn for the 
construction of Islamic stock markets?  A good place to begin is with regard to the question of 
financing of corporate growth and to ask what role the stock market plays in this task. 
The textbook function of the stock market is to help increase savings by providing an 
additional investment instrument, (namely, share purchase).  It enables individuals to buy a 
fraction of a steel plant or a shipyard, thus spreading the risks across the board.  This also helps 
investment, as without such fractional buying and risk sharing, big projects may not have been 
undertaken at all. 
However, the experience of non-Islamic countries in the real world does not quite square 
with this textbook account.  In leading industrial countries such as the United Kingdom and 
Germany, most large firms listed on the stock markets in these countries do not raise new equity 
capital at all.  Instead, they rely on their retained profits for financing almost all of their 
investment needs.  The few, usually small, companies that do go to the stock markets do not use 
the new capital for investment purposes.  Rather, they employ it as a means of acquiring liquidity 
in the early stages of their development.  The Kay Review concludes that the main role of equity 
markets is not to monitor allocation of capital between companies, but instead to oversee its 
allocation within companies.  The Review goes on to suggest that “promoting good governance 
and stewardship is….the central rather than an incidental function of the UK equity markets”  
(10). Similarly, there are relatively few initial public offerings (IPOs) in continental European 
countries such as Germany and Italy. This suggests that the role of public equity markets in these 
countries is also likely to be small (Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales 1998). 
What has happened in advanced markets like the United Kingdom is that companies now 
raise more capital through private equity and debt, which leads to a closer relationship between 
providers and users of capital.  Such a relationship is much more difficult for listed companies 
due to the fragmentation of share ownership, extensive restrictions on information that listed 
companies are allowed to share, and operational difficulty of “managing good earnings” without 
huge listed share price shocks. 
The experience of the U.S. stock market is quite different from that of the United 
Kingdom or European countries.  There are many more IPOs and more listed companies and a 
greater resort to the stock markets by small companies.  More importantly,  the U.S. stock 
markets act as an “exit mechanism” for the public flotation of companies in the hi-tech sectors, 
for private equity and venture capital that play important roles as incubators of dynamic 
entrepreneurs and innovators. 
In the case of fast-growing developing countries in Asia, the behavior of the stock market 
in mobilizing savings and financing corporate growth is also different from the U.S. or the 
European experience.  First, these countries enjoyed an enormous expansion of savings over the 
last 30 years, with savings as a proportion of national GDP growing from about 5 percent of 
GDP at the beginning of the period to 30 percent or more now.  In this huge increase in national 
savings, the stock market has played a relatively small role. 
Second, as studies by Glen and Singh (2003, 2005) and Singh (1993) have suggested, 
large firms in developing countries raise a much larger proportion of their capital from the stock 
markets than large firms in advanced countries.  This so-called Singh-paradox is counterintuitive 
and defies most explanations offered for it.  The closest reasonable interpretation is that the 
growth rate of a developing country’s firms is greater than that of advanced country 
corporations, leading to a greater demand for funds by the former.  But this explanation does not 
answer the question of why this “greater demand” should be met by equity issues rather than 
other sources.  Indeed, the question of fairness in access to capital markets arises: why should 
large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and large multinational and local firms have greater access 
to financing than the SMEs? 
According both to traditional economic theory and its further development in the seminal 
paper by Myers and Majluf (1984), the financing of corporate growth should follow the pecking 
order outlined below: firms should in the first instance rely as far as possible on retained earnings 
for their investment needs; if that is not adequate, they should resort to debt; and only as a last 
resort should they raise any funds from the stock market. Myers and Majluf show that this is 
mainly due to asymmetrical information between managers and outsiders. Glen and Singh (2005) 
confirm the earlier Singh (1995) and Singh and Hamid (1993) results for the 1980s.  Their new 
results for the 1990s suggest that the pecking order theory is comprehensively rejected by the 
data for this decade. As shown in table 10.1, on the financing of corporate growth in 19 
developing and 22 advanced countries from 1995 to 2000, developing countries during this 
period financed 39 percent of their growth from equity issues, 27 percent from retained earnings, 
and 35 percent from debt, on average. In contrast, for advanced countries, the corresponding 
figures were 17 percent, 53 percent, and 30 percent, on average.  This clearly indicates a much 
greater resort to equity issues by large firms in developing countries, compared to those of 
advanced countries. 
 
 
 
Table 10.1. Financing of Corporate Growth in 19 Developing Countries and 22 Advanced 
Countries, 1995–2000 (percent) 
Source: Glen and Singh (2005). 
Note: The basic accounting identity in this table is as follows: Total finance for corporate growth consists of the 
growth of liabilities, growth of equity capital, and the growth of internal finance. 
  
It is not the purpose of this study to explain this phenomenon, as this has been done 
elsewhere,
4
 but rather to ask what lessons those who wish to establish an Islamic stock market 
should learn from the above experience of stock market financing in advanced and developing  
countries. 
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Yurtoglu (2003) 
Developed 
markets 
Liabilities Exter- 
nal 
finance 
Internal 
finance 
 Emerging 
markets 
Liabilities External 
finance 
Inter-
nal fi-
nance 
Australia 58 32 11  Argentina 46 16 38 
Austria 52 3 45  Brazil 74 11 15 
Belgium 56 6 38  Chile 44 33 23 
Bermuda 41 23 36  Colombia 73 16 11 
Canada 56 32 12  Czech Rep. 33 21 46 
Cayman Islands 90 8 2  Hong Kong 44 20 35 
Denmark 72 6 23  Hungary 28 1 71 
Finland 53 26 22  India 53 5 43 
France 61 7 31  Indonesia 110 12 -23 
Germany 62 5 33  Israel 54 6 40 
Greece 52 34 14  Korea 27 48 25 
Ireland 76 5 18  Malaysia 40 18 42 
Italy 68 5 27  Mexico 61 30 10 
Japan 62 6 32  Philippines 34 17 49 
Netherlands 65 9 26  South Africa 49 10 41 
Norway 50 23 27  Taiwan 59 40 1 
Singapore 66 15 19  Thailand 74 11 15 
Spain 68 -9 40  Turkey 61 18 21 
Sweden 57 4 39  Venezuela 27 54 19 
Switzerland 54 7 39   
United Kingdom 52 21 27  
United States 47 21 32  
 
Group average 53 17 30  Group 
average 
35 39 27 
 
Global average 49 22 29   
It should be noted that in advanced as well as developing countries, the significance of 
public stock markets has declined while that of private equity has greatly increased.  The 
question therefore is whether a strong Islamic stock market should attempt to create a thriving 
public market with perhaps a small role for private equity markets, or sequence development the 
other way round: develop SMEs first and then the stock market as an exit mechanism. 
An important question raised by the above discussion is why more companies do not list 
on the equity markets  What measures should a future Islamic equity market take to expand its 
role to meet the financing needs of households and corporations? 
Several reasons have been put forward to explain this deficit of firms to list on the stock 
market: fiscal discrimination against equity in favor of debt; the greater burden and expenses of 
listing on the public stock market than before; and the poor performance of the public equity 
markets. 
The Kay Review suggests a more fundamental and deeper reason lies in the nature of 
financial intermediation itself, since it regards equity markets as a means of financial 
intermediation between savers and corporations.  The latter enables savers to achieve 
diversification and liquidity.  A successful intermediary enables savers to derive the benefits of 
diversification and liquidity by minimizing the disadvantages of control loss and information loss 
as the firms become bigger.  The Review suggests that information asymmetry and principal- 
agent conflicts become more serious as the modern corporate economy evolves.  The relationship 
between the investors and the corporations in large, impersonal, public equity markets is more 
distant and much less close (due to regulatory and information provision restrictions) than that 
between the management of a private equity–supported firm and its investors. The more distant 
the human relationship, the easier the moral dimension gets lost. 
The Kay Review sums up the evidence on the UK stock market in relation to savings, and 
outlines an approach to resolving difficulties in this area in the following terms: 
Equity markets today should primarily be seen as a means of getting money out of companies 
rather than a means of putting it in.  This does not mean that equity markets are not relevant to 
investment in UK business. But the relevance is indirect.  Equity markets are one of the means 
by which investors who support fledgling companies can hope to realise value.  Equity markets 
provide a means of oversight of the principal mechanism of capital allocation, which takes place 
within companies.  Promoting stewardship and good corporate governance is not an incidental 
function of equity markets.  The effectiveness of modern equity markets depends almost entirely 
on their effectiveness in promoting these goals of stewardship and governance. (28, para. 2.32, 
emphasis added) 
There are other weaknesses of non-Islamic stock markets that deserve attention.  Notably, 
these include the short-termism of the stock markets.  It is important to note that short-termism 
takes many different forms.  Apart from not being concerned with the long-term value of the 
company, it can translate into lack of investment in the company’s infrastructure, and reduction 
in expenditure on research and development and overall, a diminution of its reputation.  It can 
also take the form of making quick profits on the stock market rather than staying the course 
with long-term investment in particular companies. In view of its many manifestations, the 
phenomenon of short-termism is commented upon at more than one place in this study.  In 
chapter 12 of the General Theory, Keynes (1936, 160) adopted a straightforward definition of 
short-termism in terms of share turnover and observed as follows: “The spectacle of modern 
investment markets has sometimes moved me towards the conclusion that to make the purchase 
of an investment permanent and indissoluble, like marriage, except by reason of death or other 
grave cause, might be a useful remedy for our contemporary evils. For this would force the 
investor to direct his mind to the long-term prospects and to those only.” However, Keynes 
abandoned this idea because if individual purchases of investments were rendered illiquid, they 
might adversely affect the propensity to invest. 
The Porter Commission regarded short-termism as a major fault of U.S. capital markets. 
It proposed a tax on those who dispose of their shares quickly. Under this scheme, if an investor 
held the shares in a corporation for five or more years, he or she would be subject to a much 
lower level of taxation. Porter and his colleagues thought that such a change in the taxation of 
stock market returns would, over time, change the culture and ethos of the market and shift it 
toward long-termism. 
The Kay Review proposed a third, radically different approach to short-termism and 
stock market reform.  The remedy in the Kay Review is original and a major contribution to the 
theory of finance.  It suggests that the answer lies in having long-term relationships among all 
the players: asset managers, asset holders, and corporate directors.  It attributes short-termism to 
the decline of trust and misalignment of incentives.  The Review suggests that a culture based on 
principles of stewardship, founded on respect for those whose funds are invested, is required as a 
long-term remedy for the problems of the stock market. 
This approach fits in well with the basic ethos and culture of Islamic stock markets.  It is, 
therefore, likely to be easier to implement the vision of the Kay Review in Islamic stock markets 
than in existing non-Islamic markets.  Most commentators feel that it will not be easy to change 
existing stock markets due to resistance from those who would stand to lose from any major 
reform. 
Stock Markets and Economic Efficiency: Further Lessons for 
Islamic Stock Markets 
 
The Islamic stock market has the great advantage of being late on the scene and can 
therefore achieve fast growth and structural development much more speedily than would 
otherwise be the case.  Moreover, the history of stock markets in non-Islamic countries and their 
analyses provide rich and varied narratives about the progress of the stock market, as well as its 
difficulties in these countries.  The Islamic stock market must examine these narratives closely 
and learn the lessons that they provide.  With that in mind, we shall consider some controversial 
issues in non-Islamic stock market economics and examine their implications for Islamic 
markets.  The two main issues we shall focus on are the efficiency of the stock market prices, 
and the takeover mechanism, together with means such as bankruptcy, and delisting from the 
stock market as the disciplinary devices to increase economic efficiency. 
 
 
Stock Market and Efficiency of Share Prices 
 
Opinions differ on how “efficient” stock market prices are in theory and in practice. The 
orthodox paradigm of share price determination postulates that share prices are efficient because 
they emanate from perfect markets involving large numbers of well-informed buyers and sellers 
in which no one buyer or seller can influence the price and where there is a homogeneous 
product: namely, corporate shares.  There is  an alternative paradigm, however, indicated by the 
passage from Keynes cited earlier, that characterizes stock markets essentially as gambling 
casinos dominated by speculators.  Allen and Gale (2000); Shiller (2000); Shleifer (2000); Singh 
and others  (2005); Baker and Wurgler (2007); and Hong and Stein (2007), among others, have 
formalized the various elements of this paradigm.
5
  In brief, this literature suggests that in the 
face of a highly uncertain future, share prices are likely to be influenced by the so-called noise-
traders,  and by whims, fads, and contagion.  For similar reasons of psychology, investors may 
attribute much greater weight to near-term price forecasts rather than historical long-term 
performance, thus suggesting another reason for short-termism.  Nevertheless, many economists 
believe that overall the best theory of share price determination is the one suggested by Keynes’ 
famous “beauty contest” analogy.  This points toward strategies adopted by probably a large 
number of investors on the stock market. 
[To] change the metaphor slightly, professional investment may be likened to those newspaper 
competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred 
photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to 
the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not 
those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those of which he thinks likeliest to catch the 
fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of 
view.  It is not just a case of choosing those which, to the best of one’s judgment, are really the 
prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest.  We have reached 
the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects 
the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher 
degree. (Keynes 1936, 156) 
 
However, until recently, the empirical literature on the determination of share prices has 
been dominated by the so-called efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), which argues that real 
world share prices are efficient in the sense that they incorporate all available information (Fama 
1970). In the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, the efficient markets hypothesis suffered fundamental 
setbacks against the empirical reality of the 1987 US stock market crash, the meltdown in the 
Asian stock markets in the 1990s, the bursting of the technology stocks bubble in 2000, and the 
demise of the housing and sub-prime mortgages’ bubble in 2007–09.  None of these events is 
compatible with the fundamental valuation efficiency of the stock market.  Alan Greenspan 
(1998) has commented on the reasons for the 1987 stock market crash and Asian  stock market 
meltdown: “At one point the economic system appears stable, the next it behaves as though a 
dam has reached a breaking point, and water (read ‘confidence’) evacuates the reservoir.  The 
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United States experienced such a sudden change with the decline in stock prices of more than 20 
percent on October 19, 1987.  There is no credible scenario that can readily explain so abrupt a 
change in the fundamentals of long-term valuations on that one day.” Kindleberger ([1978], 
1989) similarly documented about 30 cases of unwarranted euphoria and excessive pessimism on 
the stock markets since the South Sea bubble of 1720.  He termed these episodes manias, panics, 
and crashes. 
James Tobin (1984) made an analytically useful distinction between two kinds of 
efficiency of stock markets. The first is information arbitrage efficiency, which ensures that all 
information concerning a firm’s shares immediately percolates to all stock market participants, 
ensuring that no participant can make a profit on such public information. The second is 
fundamental valuation efficiency, which ensures that share prices accurately reflect a firm’s 
fundamentals: namely, its long-term expected profitability.  The growing consensus view is that, 
in these terms, stock markets may at best be regarded as being efficient in the first sense but are 
far from being efficient in the economically more important second sense).  Thus the efficient 
markets hypothesis, as identified in information arbitrage efficiency, is compatible with share 
prices not reflecting fundamental values.  A prominent supporter of  the efficient markets 
hypothesis, Fischer Black (1986), observed this in his presidential address to the American 
Finance Association, noting that the efficient market theory of the stock market “seems 
reasonable” if we adopt the right definition of “efficient.”  He defined “efficient” to mean that 
individual company stock prices are between half true value and twice true value almost all the 
time, and he defined “almost all” the time to mean at least 90 percent.6  This illustrates, at a very 
conservative level, the difference between theory and empirical reality in relation to the orthodox 
hypothesis.  A more detailed discussion, as well as other examples of share prices evidently 
departing from their fundamentals for prolonged periods, is provided in Singh and others (2005). 
Apart from the day-to-day mispricing of share prices on the stock market—which is 
particularly likely to be severe in developing countries because their firms do not have a long 
track record— share prices in developing countries are more volatile than in advanced countries.7  
The volatility of share prices, however, is a negative feature of stock markets for several reasons.  
First, it reduces the efficiency of the price signals in allocating investment resources.  Second, it 
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increases the riskiness of investments and may discourage risk-averse corporations from 
financing their growth via equity issues and indeed from seeking a stock market listing at all.  
Third, at the macroeconomic level, a highly volatile stock market may lead to financial fragility 
for the entire economy (Singh 1997).  
 
Takeovers and Bankruptcy as Disciplinary Mechanisms 
 
It is important in this context for Islamic scholars favoring the establishment of stock 
markets to also bear in mind that the stock market often “spontaneously” leads to the 
development of a market for corporate control.  Such a market exists in countries like the United 
States and the United Kingdom, and plays an active role in these economies.  In developing 
countries, this market exists so far only in a rudimentary form.  This is because in most of these 
countries, stock markets are immature and lack sufficient separation of ownership from control.  
Nevertheless, developing country governments come under pressure from big players in the 
system to establish a free market for corporate control.  Parenthetically, this market  for 
corporate control is regarded by traditional economics as the evolutionary end point of stock 
market development.   
Empirical evidence, however, is all to the contrary.  Research shows that the takeover 
mechanism as it works in the real world is highly flawed.  Selection in the market for corporate 
control takes place not on the basis of performance alone, but on the basis of size, as well.  Thus, 
a large relatively unprofitable firm has a greater chance of survival than a small profitable firm.  
This has adverse consequences for economic efficiency.
8
  The market for corporate control, 
instead of being a vehicle for economic efficiency, exacerbates the shortcomings of the stock 
markets by encouraging speculative takeovers of whole companies rather than just buying and 
selling of a few shares of individual companies.  Thus, in the non-Islamic world, in conventional 
economic terms, neither the pricing mechanism nor the takeover mechanism  are helpful to 
economic efficiency and development. 
The third issue is the effectiveness of the exit mechanism for failed companies, such as 
delisting from the stock market or bankruptcy.  The important disciplinarian role of the exit 
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mechanism is that failed institutions should exit and that there are consequences for failure.  
Many emerging market stock markets do not work well because of the lack of enforcement of 
rules or not allowing more delisting and bankruptcy of failed companies.  Indeed, in a number of 
cases, governments have been known to intervene in stock markets to bail out companies in 
trouble.  However, not all interventions to prevent the closure of large firms in developed or 
developing economies are necessarily wrong.  The orthodox view is that such action only 
engenders more moral hazard problems, eroding the disciplinary role of financial markets.  
However, a full cost-benefit analysis of the proposed intervention is required, including not just 
the financial outcomes but also the relevant social costs and benefits, before it can be concluded 
that the cost of intervention is too high in terms of erosion of financial market discipline.  It is 
also worth noting that one way in which takeovers may be helpful is the case of a declining 
company that may be acquired by before it fails.   
 
Stock Market Efficiency in Non-Islamic Markets: Further Lessons for Islamic 
Markets 
The main lesson that the architects of Islamic stock markets should draw from the 
complex literature on share price determination and the takeover mechanism is that there are 
broadly two kinds of agents who participate in the stock market.  One of these is interested in 
maximizing the long-term value of the company in which he or she is investing.  The second is a 
trader who is interested only in the share prices and whether he or she can make an immediate 
profit on the basis of the analysis of these prices and their movements over time.  The second 
category of investor  is not at all interested in the long-term value.  Such investors try to forecast 
the psychology of the market and ascertain how they can profit from it.  The main implication for 
the Islamic stock market is that in a conventional market, both kinds of individuals or economic 
agents will be present.  In order to achieve its long-term goals, the Islamic stock market must 
encourage the former and attempt to discourage the latter type of activity.  Short-termism will 
run counter to Shari’ah laws, but it is difficult to provide proof of this behavior because no one 
will admit that they were playing the market rather than seeking long-term maximization of the 
value of the firm in which they had invested.  As suggested by the Kay Review, the ideas of 
trust, stewardship, and straightforward honesty will need to be brought to bear on this 
fundamental issue. 
To avoid the difficulties of immature markets—which are bound to arise in developing 
countries due to the operations of a market for corporate control—an alternative form of 
regulation is to be much more cautious in allowing the takeover market to emerge.  Research 
shows that takeovers represent a very costly mechanism for changing firm management, 
especially when takeover bids are contested.  Even when they are not contested, the transaction 
costs tend to be high.
9
  Takeovers and mergers also greatly increase the dangers of short-
termism, and encourage speculation and financial engineering, rather than the pursuit of the 
classic capitalist goals of reducing costs and producing new products.  Importantly, neither 
Germany nor Japan nor any of the successful East Asian newly industrialized countries had a 
market for corporate control during their development.   
Research also shows that such a market is arbitrary and uncertain in its effects.   There is 
no perfect solution to the need for change in management and ownership.  Proponents of the  
Anglo-American system argue that the Darwinian process of creative destruction requires 
takeovers as means of accelerating change. Opponents argue that such bidding wars are costly 
and the change has not necessarily benefited investors, due to the asset-stripping behavior that 
regulators cannot always prevent.  Developing countries must find a cheaper way of changing 
firm management than the takeover mechanism that currently works in countries like the United 
States and the United Kingdom. 
 
Issues of Globalization and of Long-Term Growth for Islamic Stock 
Markets 
 
The discussion that follows briefly considers the growth question first, as it is in some 
ways easier to answer.  This is what was referred to earlier as the natural progression theory, 
which asserts that as economies grow, so does the stock market, which is therefore an emblem of 
development.  It will take us too far afield to discuss this theory in depth.  However, even broad-
brush evidence on this issue is telling. For example, it is useful to note that the economic 
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miracles that occurred in the second half of the twentieth century can hardly be ascribed to the 
stock market and its development.  Thus, in Europe, the Italian miracle (very fast growth), the 
German miracle, and the Austrian miracle, and in Asia, the justly famous miracles of the 
Republic of Korea or Taiwan, China, did not depend conspicuously on the equity or bond 
markets in these countries.  Similarly, an examination of comparative growth rates over a long 
hundred-year time span indicates that bank-based countries (such as Germany and Japan) have as 
good, if not better, a long-term record than the United States and the United Kingdom.  Pagano 
(1993) notes that the Italian stock market was bigger 100 years ago than it was in 1990.  The 
Italian economy evidently grew during these 100 years without any expansion of its stock 
market.  There are wide inter-country differences in the size of the stock market relative to GDP 
in various European countries.  In the United Kingdom, the ratio of stock market value to GDP is 
five times larger than in Denmark, Finland, France, and Germany,  and six times larger than in 
Italy and Norway.  Pagano (1993) reports that in Italy, not only has the number of listed 
companies stagnated for nearly a century, but the total worth of companies trading has not kept 
pace with the economy as a whole.  At the turn of the century (1906), total market capitalization 
of Italian firms was 26.3 percent, compared to 12.1 percent in 1991.  Explaining inter-country 
differences in the incidence of stock market capitalization, the number of companies listed on the 
stock market, and related questions are subjects for research that cannot be pursued here because 
these lie outside the scope of the present study. 
The discussion now turns to the impact of globalization on Islamic stock markets. Simply 
and starkly put, Islamic stock markets cannot operate independently from non-Islamic financial 
markets. 
First, contagion will always occur, due to arbitrage activities between markets, even 
though such arbitrage may not be either legal or permissible under Shari’ah rules. 
Second, the fact that current global markets are highly distorted in terms of interest rates, 
exchange rates, different tax rates, and policy regimes means that there will be impact on Islamic 
stock markets. 
Third, the regulatory rules governing Islamic stock markets and non-Islamic stock 
markets will be different, primarily because Islamic finance has Shari’ah rules that govern the 
moral foundations of Islamic markets.  In the final analysis, the Islamic stock market is only as 
strong as its technical and legal infrastructure; the quality of listed companies’ financial 
intermediaries; and the way that Islamic regulators, courts, and interpretation of Shari’ah laws 
reinforce trust in the Islamic financial system and avoid the moral hazard and egregious behavior 
that currently mar and undermine non-Islamic markets. 
Fourth, if non-Islamic financial markets suffer from short-termism and lack of trust, can 
Islamic markets protect themselves from “infection”? 
The bottom line is that currently, non-Islamic stock markets suffer from the curse that 
modern finance appears to be serving itself rather than serving the real sector.  Being built on 
moral foundations, Islamic stock markets must demonstrate that they serve the real sector more 
effectively, more equitably, and more sustainably. 
How can we induce the financial system to serve the real sector?  The answer is that if the 
financial system makes money, while the real sector is losing money, finance is not symbiotic or 
aligned with the real sector.  Finance as a service industry can prosper only when its principal, 
the real sector, prospers.  Therefore, the incentives that drive finance must be aligned with the 
real sector, not just in the short term, but in the long term as well.  To do so, the marginal 
revenue from serving the real sector must be equal to the marginal cost of doing so.  In other 
words, profits from toxic excessive leverage should be taxed or regulated—and if need be, 
incentives should be provided for lending to the real sector.  The current global regulatory 
reforms do not address this basic distortion in incentives. 
In that regard, we are convinced that conventional finance theory and its practice has 
forgotten its institutional history.  Finance grew out of serving the real sector, with a foundation 
in moral ethics and trust, and acting as the credit disciplinarian and corporate governance 
steward for borrowers and listed companies.  Indeed, in the first decade of the last century, legal 
trusts were ubiquitous on the stock market and the dealings on the market were expected to be 
trustworthy, not just in a legal sense, but in terms of normal usage of the word “trust.” To cite a 
small but pertinent example, at the beginning of the twentieth century in England, there were 19 
provincial stock exchanges in cities like Birmingham and Manchester.  Economic historians note 
that they performed very useful functions, including raising substantial amounts of equity capital 
for local firms, and worked on the basis of trust rather than formal legal rules.  However, none of 
these provincial exchanges function today.  Economies of scale enjoyed by the London stock 
market have overwhelmed all the small stock exchanges.
10 
 
Indeed, with the arrival of modern finance theory and derivative financing, the game has 
become global, impersonal, and a celebration of private greed at public expense.  When financial 
markets become impersonal and too large and too complex to manage, they can lose their moral 
bearings. Personal accountability becomes lost in impersonal “public responsibility.”  
Everybody’s money is nobody’s money, so liberal monetary creation for all loses all sense of 
responsibility.  It is as if inflation is good for all.   It may be good for those with huge debt 
overhang, but the poor and those with holdings of paper assets will suffer. 
This analogy of provincial stock exchanges with the Islamic stock market will be valid 
only if the latter remains small and relatively local.  It does underscore the point that the role of 
financial intermediaries in safeguarding the moral bearings of Islamic finance is critical.  They 
must start small in helping the SMEs to raise funds for trade, investments, and risk taking.  This 
calls for a very different approach from the “mega-markets” of centralizing liquidity through 
sheer scale.  The Islamic stock market will also have to discourage any strategic pricing that is 
not concerned with enhancing the long-term value of corporations; be on guard against the threat 
of contagion; and try to avoid any negative feedback loops that may arise from the interaction 
between the stock market and the foreign exchange market in a crisis situation. 
 
 Conclusion 
  
Currently, there is widespread dissatisfaction with the stock markets in advanced 
countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, where such markets have been 
historically important.  The UK Equity Market (Kay) Review  is most illuminating.  It 
recommends a root and branch change in the conduct of the stock markets.  It calls for long-term 
relationships among all participants in the equity chain: relationships that are based on respect 
and trust and involve notions of stewardship and mutual respect.  The report also suggests that 
the whole ethos of the stock market should change to permit the exercise of appropriate values of 
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trust, stewardship, and honesty. 
In essence, since stock markets are systems, the long-term viability and sustainability of 
systems depend on the tradeoff among three overlapping but often conflicting objectives: 
efficiency in resource allocation; stability and resilience to internal and external shocks; and 
fairness and equity, enabling all to access the market in a competitive manner.    The fact that 
stock markets, like all systems, require oversight and regulation, particularly during crises, 
means that government intervention is inevitable.   The current crisis has amply demonstrated 
that the efficient markets hypothesis assumed that efficiency would take care of stability and 
social equity. 
It is the central contention of this study that the proponents of Islamic stock markets will 
find it easier to implement Kay’s reform program for the stock market than their U.K. 
counterparts.  The strong ethical basis of the Islamic stock market gives it a decisive edge in 
meeting the requirements of the Kay Review. Indeed, it may come to pass that the tutor and the 
pupil reverse their roles. The U.K. stock market may well learn from the experience of the 
Islamic stock market, with its strong ethical underpinnings.   
The advocates of Islamic stock markets in various country settings should regard the 
project of establishing such markets a long-term commitment that may take two to three decades 
to complete.
11
 They should begin by concentrating on the financing needs of the excluded, 
particularly  SMEs, and by implementing the spirit of the Kay Review, which is very much in 
accord with Islamic ethics. It may also be useful to start the actual establishment of Islamic stock 
markets in a small number of Muslim countries on a national basis in the first instance. However, 
as people come to know one another and as the knowledge base and experience expand, the 
national stock markets may integrate into regional or international Islamic stock markets.  
Developing markets is a process of learning and adapting. 
The second major lesson is that advocates of  Islamic stock markets should not permit a 
market for corporate control to arise either “spontaneously” or by design.  This is because, as 
discussed, such a market leads to short-termism, speculation, rapid turnover of shares, and 
strategic pricing—all of which go against the grain of an Islamic stock market.   
This raises an important question: If takeovers are not to be used to discipline errant or 
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poorly performing firms, how should these firms be controlled? The answer is simple but 
extremely important. All firms should in the first instance be subject to the discipline of 
competition in their primary product and service markets.  The exit mechanism in terms of 
bankruptcy laws and the court mechanisms should have higher priority in the policy agenda, 
rather than takeover mechanisms. 
Islamic stock markets will have to devote more attention to the stability and equitable 
aspects of market systems through their ethical and moral base.   Since Islamic finance investors 
and market participants are relatively new and inexperienced, it will take time to nurture the 
development of Islamic stock markets to balance the three objectives of stability, robustness, and 
fairness in a transparent and sustainable manner. 
To put all the above into practice will not be easy, but this is a worthy exercise and 
challenge for Islamic finance practitioners.  It is also a historic opportunity to enter the global 
market at a time when there is widespread dissatisfaction with the conduct of stock markets and 
related financial institutions in advanced countries. 
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